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PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS AND THEIR
ENFORCEMENT
Donald Campbell *
T HE LEGAL RIGHTS, duties, and obligations of individuals have,
in general, been sufficiently defined in Anglo-American law,
and procedures have been made available to make them effective,
without much resort to legal fictions. The corporation and the
trust are also well known in law and, while vehicles of procedure
may be more complex in those instances, there is little likelihood
that there will be a miscarriage of justice in these areas because
of technicalities in process, pleading, judgments and the enforce-
ment thereof. Where, however, the law deals with partnerships,
voluntary associations, joint stock companies, trade unions and
other loosely-knit organizations,' pitfalls abound not only as to
the nature of the attendant rights and obligations but also as
to procedural questions of venue, service of process, judgments
and the enforcement thereof so that the real merits are often not
reached or discussed and justice has often been caused to mis-
carry.
Partnerships, in this respect, are chameleons, capable of
changing legal color from "aggregate" to "entity,' and back
again; sometimes with the blessing of a statute, but often with
the curse of the adversary party. There should be no need to
belabor the difficulties and disappointments which can arise in
connection with meritorious attempts to pursue and to collect
from partners. 2 It may be noted, however, that while the law
has created many fictions3 and has made use thereof as vehicles
* Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 Although this discussion deals primarily with partnership problems, many of
the points made are equally applicable to other forms of voluntary association.
2 The reports are full of such cases, and the legal periodicals abound with
literature on the subject. See, for example, a comment in 42 IM. L. Rev. 72, treat-
ing mainly with questions of service of process on partnerships, particularly those
operating in Illinois.
8 Legal fictions may be logical or fanciful. Compare: (a) in England, the King
is always in court, hence cannot be non-suited; (b) in the action of trover the
defendant was said to be the "finder" of property belonging to the plaintiff. The
first of these fictions comes close to fact; the second is mere diplomacy.
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to reach conclusions considered just and equitable, there is a grand
crevasse created by certain of the legal ideas used in relation to
partnerships. In particular, the gap between the "aggregate"
fact and the "entity" fiction has been the source of much legal
perplexity. It is probably effrontery to state that the use of more
fiction as to the entity of a partnership would have made easier
the solution of constantly recurring partnership questions but it
is clear that the Uniform Partnership Act, as drawn, has failed
in this regard.4 As a consequence, an exposition of, and some
suggested solutions for, the particular problems arising in con-
nection with the nature of partnership obligations, concerning
venue, and the acquisition of jurisdiction, as well as the enforce-
ment of judgments affecting partnerships would not be amiss.-
I. PARTNE.SHIP OBLIGATION AND LIABILITY
At common law and currently, a partnership is considered
as an aggregation of individuals jointly owning property and
jointly engaged in the use thereof in an enterprise designed for
their common profit. Each partner is an agent for the others and,
within the express or implied and obvious scope of the business,
may create benefits or incur obligations in the permitted area.
When an obligation of the several partners has arisen, other than
those tortiously incurred, it would be logical to treat the same
as a joint obligation and it is so regarded in law. Common law
procedure for the enforcement of these joint obligations, however,
produced crude and almost unbelievable results,6 with the dis-
4 The Commissioner of Uniform Laws were quite troubled, in preparing the
Uniform Partnership Act, so as to make it embody both the theory of entity and
the aggregate fact. Dean Ames had originally favored the entity theory. His
successor, Dean Lewis, leaned toward the aggregate idea but with modifications.
The latter view was adopted but not until after the proposed code had been
worked over for more than ten years. See prefatory note to Uniform Partnership
Act in 7 U.L.A. 1-2.
5 Although the problems and cases discussed herein will be drawn primarily
from Illinois sources, it is quite certain that statutory changes in other states
have left many of these problems without satisfactory solution.
6 Mention might be made of the fact that it was once necessary to proceed to
outlaw all partners who could not be served with process before a Judgment could
be taken against those served. While this English practice never prevailed in the
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tinction between joint obligations on the one hand and joint and
several obligations on the other persisting for hundreds of years
with adverse effect on pleadings, judgments, and justice. Aston-
ishingly enough, the distinction has been preserved in Colorado,
Illinois, and New York as to partnership obligations arising from
contract, and other states are not wholly free from this historical
distinction despite statutes making joint obligations into joint and
several ones.
Partners are liable in solido for partnership obligations and,
quite generally, so are joint contract obligors in other fields of
law. Nonetheless, and with the exception of partners, substan-
tially all joint obligors are liable severally as well as jointly.
Inasmuch as a joint obligor, even a partner, can individually dis-
charge a joint obligation if he wishes, it is difficult to perceive
why the Uniform Partnership Act did not declare all partnership
obligations to be joint and several in conformity with statutory
provisions dealing with joint rights and obligations such as exist
in most jurisdictions, 7 provisions intended to remedy the contrary
harsh theory of the common law, with its attendant procedural
difficulties. One of the risks which any partner undertakes is that
of being personally called upon to pay all partnership obligations.
If he does so, he has his own recourse against his fellows. Why,
then, should not this ultimate risk be made immediate, and arise
at the time of the original undertaking? Why place the burden
of seeking out and pursuing hidden or absent partners upon those
who deal with partnerships? Why not suit and judgment against
any convenient partner, leaving it to him to settle with his fellows?
Modern procedural statutes frequently allow the conduct of
an action against a series of joint obligors, with judgment per-
mitted against those served for the full amount, but with a limit
United States, it found a cumbersome counterpart in the necessity of having sum-
mons returned "not found," in exhausting the cause of action by judgment against
those served, and following up with eoire facia8 at a later date as to partners out
of the jurisdiction. Justice Bradley, in Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. (1 Otto) 160,
23 L. Ed. 271 (1875), remarked on the dilatory nature of proceedings of that
character and the desirability of finding some way by which service on one
partner should be made to answer for service on all.
7 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, §3.
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that there shall be only one satisfaction, without loss of the cause
of action against those not served." Any attempt to apply this
procedure to partners is, in many jurisdictions, blocked by the
terms of the Uniform Partnership Act which specifically states
that the contractual obligations of partners are joint, not joint
and several.9 Even before Illinois adopted the uniform act in
1917, the state supreme court, in Fleming v. Ross,'0 had held that
partnership contracts were joint in character, so that a judgment
taken against those partners served operated to exhaust the cause
of action, making it necessary for the creditor to pursue those
not served by scire facias. That decision having been attained
despite the presence of a general joint rights and obligations
statute, it is unlikely, although much to be desired, that the state
supreme court would declare, in a proper future case, that the
presence of a modern procedural provision for the taking of
several judgments would be enough to reverse the theory ex-
pounded in the Fleming case. It would, then, seem to be necessary
to secure further legislation on the point.
Although the objective of the Uniform Partnership Act was
to make uniform the substantive law of partnership, no great
departure would have been made if it had declared that all part-
nership civil liability should be several as well as joint in char-
acter. To retain joint liability, as that liability was known to the
common law, was neither progressive nor enlightened codification.
If enlightened procedural provisions are not enough to modify,
or in some instances practically to circumvent, the common law
theory of joint liability, and if statutory provisions with respect
to liability being both joint and several for purpose of suit are
inadequate, then something else should be devised. To attempt a
summary of current statutes in all American jurisdictions would
8 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 151, reads: "When several joint debtors
are sued, and any one or more of them shall not be served with process, the
pendency of such suit or the recovery of a judgment against the parties served
shall not be a bar to a recovery on the original cause of action against such as
are not served, in any action which may thereafter be brought. This section shall
not be so construed as to allow more than one satisfaction."
9 U.P.A. §15(b) ; IlL Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 106J, § 15(b).
10225 Ill. 149, 80 N. E. 92 (1907).
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overtax the effort available for this paper." It could be suggested,
however, that a clean sweep of the patch work, special procedures,
and other exceptions allowed with regard to the common law
concept of joint liability could be effected by the adoption of a
simple provision similar to the one in use in the District of
Columbia. 2
II. VENUE, SERVICE, AND JURMSDICTION
Clarification of the law with respect to the nature of partner-
ship obligations is but one step, for uncertainties would still exist
with respect to their enforcement. Problems of venue arise in part
because of the inherent nature of the partnership, as viewed at
common law, and in part because of the possibility that the busi-
ness of the partnership may be transacted through non-partner
agents, through one or more resident partners, or with no partners
resident in the area of business transaction or in the county and
state of the adverse party. Some statutory provisions have been
of help in securing venue but others have been declared uncon-
stitutional, or repealed, because of the holding in Pennoyer v.
Neff,18 even though that case has lost some of its force as
authority. In addition, the common law history of venue14 has
tended to prevent a fair appraisal of the fundamental purpose for
laying venue. Without that background, the laying of venue should
be a matter of attaining a fair balance between the convenience
of the plaintiff and that of the defendant, especially since wit-
11 What the law was, and substantially still is, may be seen in a comprehensive
annotation appearing In 1 A. L. R. 1601 and in Burdick, "Joint and Several Liability
of Partners," 11 Col. L. Rev. 101 (1911). The summaries there provided have
changed but little despite the passage of years.
12 D. C. Code 1951, Tit. 16, § 901, states: "Every contract and obligation entered
into by two or more persons, whether partners or merely joint contractors, whether
under seal or not, and whether written or verbal, and whether expressed to be
joint and several or not, shall for the purposes of suit thereupon be deemed joint
and several."
IS 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
14 At inception, inquisitions and juries were also the witnesses or, more correctly
stated, rendered verdicts on the basis of their own knowledge concerning the
parties and the issues. A trial then was, necessarily, a local affair. With the
advent of testimony from third persons, required to supply Information where
direct knowledge on the part of the jury was lacking, and with the development of
the concept of a transitory cause of action, the original basis for venue tended to
disappear.
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nesses can now, quite generally, testify by deposition in civil
cases, hence their convenience would seem to be a matter of
secondary concern. 15 There should, then, be no overweening diffi-
culty in fixing venue for suit in partnership cases. It is true,
however, that venue, service, and the acquisition of jurisdiction are
inextricably interwoven, so all of these must be considered in
determining the validity of the eventual judgment.
The Illinois Civil Practice Act has provided a reasonable
degree of modernization in relation to many aspects of practice
and procedure but, so far as venue in suits against partnerships
is concerned, which actions lie against the partners as individuals,
no special provision has been made to ease the burdens already
noted. Venue has been carefully spelled out as to defendants in
different counties, as to printers of libel, as "to corporations,
whether private, municipal, or quasi-municipal, and as to those
engaged in the business of insurance,'0 but no equivalent distinc-
tive treatment appears for partnership suits.
There was a time when statutory treatment existed 17 but it
did not survive long enough to be incorporated in the present
statute. In an early case resting on the former statute, that of
Watson v. Coon,18 service was had upon an agent of the partner-
ship in a county where one of the firm's several lumber yards was
located. Both of the defendant partners were non-residents of
the county wherein the resident agent had been served but they
were residents of the state. The defendants appeared specially
and moved to quash the return of summons. When this motion
was denied, they stood by their motion and judgment was entered
against them. In affirming, the Supreme Court referred, by
analogy, to the provision that a corporation could be sued, and
15 A different result has been achieved in criminal cases because of the presence
of constitutional guarantees on the point, as well as a theoretical intense public
interest in the outcome of criminal cases.
Is 1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 131-3.
17 See Hurd, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1908, Ch. 110, § 13, which reads: "A co-partnership,
the members of which are all non-residents, but having a place or places of business
in any county of this State In which suit may be instituted, may be sued by the
usual and ordinary name which It has assumed and under which it is doing busi-
ness and service of process may be had in such county upon such co-partnership
by serving the same upon any agent of said co-partnership within this State."
Is 247 Ill. 414, 93 N. E. 289 (1910).
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jurisdiction obtained, in any county in the state, by service on
the corporation's agent. The court expressed the belief that it had
been the intention of the legislature to place partnerships upon a
basis similar to corporations and that, while the term "non-resi-
dent" could mean one non-resident of the state, it meant, as used
in this statute, one who was a resident of the state but a non-
resident of the county in which venue had been laid and where
business had been transacted by the non-partner agent.
Twenty years after the Watson case, the Supreme Court of
Illinois, in the case of Werner v. W. H. Shons Company,19 had
further occasion to analyze this statute, this time with respect to
a judgment which had been entered in favor of the plaintiff
against "W. H. Shons Co." The validity of service of process
was the direct issue and it -turned on a return which stated that
the sheriff had served the summons by reading it to an agent,
and by delivering a copy thereof to him, inasmuch as "the said
W. H. Shons Company or any member of said firm" had not
been found in the county. With a penetrating analysis as to the
facts of service and of the precise language of the statute, the
Supreme Court, on this occasion, came to the conclusion that no
valid service had been made, hence there was no jurisdiction
present to support the judgment. It noted that the statute in
question authorized a form of substituted or constructive service
in those cases where the partnership was composed of those who
were non-residents of the county where the firm had carried on
business provided they were, nonetheless, residents of the state.
It was said, however, that there was nothing in the return, or in
the record, to show the character of "W. H. Shons Company"
or to disclose whether that name designated an individual using
a trade name, a partnership, or a corporation. Since strict com-
pliance with the statute would require the giving of this informa-
tion, the service was invalid for lack thereof.
20
19341 Ill. 478, 173 N. E. 486 (1930).
20 An argument by plaintiff that the entry of a judgment created a presumption
in law that jurisdiction had been acquired was defeated by defendant's special
appearance for the sole purpose of testing service. It was also stated that a
recital In a judgment of the fact of proper service would not stand up in the face
of an official return showing a want of service. On that point, see Galpin v. Page,
85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 350, 21 L. Ed. 959 (1874).
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While subject to a narrow construction, the statute referred
to in the Watson and Werner cases did serve a salutary purpose.
It passed out of existence, unfortunately, with the adoption of
the present Civil Practice Act, so it is no longer possible to rely
thereon. Instead, the present statute makes it possible to lay
venue in any county where one or more of the defendants reside,
or in which the transaction or some part thereof arose.
21 It is of
help where partners reside in different counties, provided all live
within the boundaries of the state, but it does not expressly cover
the case of partners living without the state nor does it sanction
service on a local agent of the firm. These two deficiencies call
for a measure of correction but, as they involve constitutional
issues of due process, they form the most difficult part of the
problem of enforcing partnership obligations.
There is no provision in the Uniform Partnership Act for
substituted or constructive service22 and this omission could be
expected in view of the fact that the act was aimed to make uni-
form the substantive, rather than the procedural, law relating to
partnerships. A few states have, therefore, adopted statutory
provisions for substituted or constructive service upon non-resi-
dent partners, meaning those who reside outside the boundaries
of the state where the suit is brought, provided service of sum-
mons can properly be had within the jurisdiction of suit upon
the agent who has conducted the partnership business for it in the
state of venue.28 It is unlikely that a personal judgment against
the non-residents thus served would be recognized in the sister
states. Such is the view taken in the case of Flexner v. Farson,
24
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 131. The concluding sentence thereof
reads: "If all defendants are non-residents of the State, an action may be com-
menced in any county." It, however, does no more than fix possible venue.
22 Section 4 of the Uniform Partnership Act, providing for rules of construction,
does state: "(1) The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed shall have no application to this act." It continues: "(3) The
law of agency shall apply under this act." Little attention appears to have been
given to the possible impact of these words on the instant problems.
23 No statute is needed with respect to the acquisition of jurisdiction over prop-
erty within the state for purpose of an in rem proceeding, but many such statutes
also exist.
24 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327 (1915), affirmed in 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63
L. Ed. 250 (1919).
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wherein plaintiff began an action in Kentucky against a non-
resident partnership which had done business in that state. Serv-
ice was had upon one who had been agent of the partnership at
the time of the transaction but who was no longer agent at the
time of service of summons. 25 Plaintiff had judgment in Kentucky
and then began proceedings on the judgment in Illinois, where
the partners resided. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to give
full faith and credit to the judgment so rendered for the reason
that no jurisdiction had been acquired over the Illinois residents
and consent to jurisdiction could not be implied. The Supreme
Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
affirmed that decision.
Notwithstanding this, and comparable results attained in
other cases of similar import, there is occasion to believe that
there is not only ample room for improvement in the law but that
a change could be justified both equitably and constitutionally.
In the first place, if a partnership, whether composed of domestic
or foreign partners, were to be treated as a legal person, under
the entity theory, even though not of the same clay as a corpora-
tion, a statute authorizing substituted or constructive service upon
the firm, by service upon an agent in charge of the transaction
or on one charged generally with the conduct of the firm business,
would provide an analogy extremely close to the one found in the
case of the foreign corporation which has done business in the
state. In this assumed situation, the firm could be required to
designate an agent for purpose of service before being permitted
to do business in a state other than the one of its residence.
To counteract the argument that a state may not constitution-
ally, in the face of an equal privileges and immunities clause,
forbid or condition the conduct of ordinary business transactions
by individual non-residents, or by groups or aggregates of such
individuals, it could be suggested that the non-resident individ-
uals, or aggregations of them, otherwise free from personal
service in the jurisdiction where the "foreign" transactions have
25 This weak link in the chain appears to have had no bearing on the final out-
come of the case, for the final decision was reached without emphasis on the point.
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been carried on, would, under such a statute, be given a treatment
no different than that accorded to residents. Residents engaged in
business are subject to the process and jurisdiction of local courts.
If "outlanders" are not, they receive not equal but favored treat-
ment. To bring them within the reach of process, through their
agents, would not produce discrimination but would erase a dis-
crimination now visited against local inhabitants.
Recourse, if necessary, may be had to decisions dealing with
the acquisition of jurisdiction over non-resident motorists who
use the highways of the state.26 The approach there has been not
that the driver is excluded from entering the foreign state but
that, by voluntarily driving upon the highways thereof, he con-
sents to the imposition of reasonable conditions, those which
condition the right of all or at least place all upon the same basis
with regard to being amenable to suit for wrong doing. Business
jurisdiction over non-residents would seem to have an even
broader basis for justifiable conditions reasonably applied.
It is worthy of notice in that connection that, as early as 1934,
Pennsylvania produced a land-mark decision in the case of Stoner
v. Higginson,27 one which could be said to have shaken, or at
least disturbed, those who believe in the rule of Flexner v. Far-
son. 2  At the time of the action, Pennsylvania had a "Fictitious
Name" statute2 1 under which the true owners of a business,
trading under a fictitious name, were required as a prerequisite
to engaging in business in any county in the state, to designate
a local agent upon whom service could be had. The defendants
there concerned were partners doing business under a fictitious
26 Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U. S. 852, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927). The
fictional theory of voluntary appointment of an agent for purpose of service, origi-
nally indulged in to make the non-resident motorist statutes constitutionally
palatable, appears to have gone by the board: Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
-U. S. -, 74 S. Ct. 83, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 7 (1953), and Ogdon v. Glanakos, 415
Ill. 591, 114 N. E. (2d) 68 (1953).
27 316 Pa. 481, 175 A. 527 (1934).
28268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327 (1915), affirmed n 248 U. S. 289, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63
L. Ed. 250 (1919).
29 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 54, § 28.1 et seq.
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name, were actually residents of and living in New York, and
service was had upon an agent who had been designated as such
pursuant to this statute. Another Pennsylvania statute provided
for substituted or constructive service. 30 Process in the case also
complied with this statute. The defendants appeared specially,
moved to quash the summons, and attacked the validity of the
return, relying particularly on an alleged lack of due process and
a claimed "absolute" right, as individuals or an aggregation of
individuals, to do'business without hinderance or condition.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the points so
raised by indicating that due process called primarily for notice
and an opportunity to defend, which requisites had been observed.
It looked with a jaded eye upon "absolute" rights generally,
stating that "absolute," in the instant case as in most, if not all,
instances, meant no more than "in a lawful manner and subject
to reasonable regulation." The imposition of reasonable condi-
tions to the doing of business within the state was said to differ
in no essential way from those conditions required of local busi-
nesses, the owners of which were subject to local venue and service
of process. Public policy was also said to buttress the require-
ment for the naming of an agent for service.
The query might well now be posed whether decisions of the
character to be found in Hess v. Pawloski3 ' and in Stoner v.
Higginson32 have not theoretically overruled the holding in Flex-
ner v. Farson3 by bringing to bear, upon the facts and the law,
the additional weight of a public policy intended to make remedies
both effective and available. If so, is not one solution .to the
30 Ibid., Tit. 12, § 297, states: "When any person or persons, not being residents
of this commonwealth, shall engage in business in any county of this common-
wealth, it shall and may be lawful for the officer charged with the execution of
any writ of process issued out of any of the courts of this commonwealth to serve
the same upon any clerk or agent of such person or persons, at the usual place of
business or residence of such agent or clerk, with like effect as though such writ
or process was served personally upon the principal."
31274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
32316 Pa. 481, 175 A. 527 (1934).
38 See citation in note 28, ante.
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problems involved in the enforcement of partnership obligations
the wholesale enactment of statutes comparable to the two existing
in Pennsylvania ?
4
Continuing a stop beyond the fictitious or trade name situa-
tions, the analogies and the arguments advanced seem a little less
certain. Where the firm name contains less or more than the true
names of all of the owners, it may then be said to be fictitious.
But would similar classification and conditions apply to the case
of one, or more than one, trader where the full true name, or
names, appeared in the title under which business was transacted?
Suppose, for example, that John Doe was a sole trader who had
done business in his own true name through a local agent but was
actually a non-resident. Would he come within the purview of a
statute similar to the one found in Pennsylvania? If both John
Doe and Richard Roe, co-partners, being non-residents, had trans-
acted their business through a local agent, using their own true
names, would they fall within the reach of either a fictitious name
or a constructive service statute?
These queries propound a hard nut not easily cracked, with
a negative answer likely to cut the ground from under the argu-
ments heretofore advanced. Resort to broad concepts of public
policy, based on a claim for fair dealing and equality between local
claimants and their adversaries, whether local or non-resident,
would deserve consideration. Under previously established, well-
hardened constitutional principles calling for actual personal
service within the jurisdiction as a prerequisite to a personal
judgment, it must be admitted that discrimination operated against
the local claimant and the local trader where, despite the presence
of local transactions, the owners of a competing business were
non-residents. Here it is, then, that some lively and legal fiction
could be indulged in to bring about greater justice in shorter time
than is possible under the awkward and cumberous principles of
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq., dealing with fictitious names,
is inadequate in that, by Section 7 thereof, partnerships operating under a name
which "shall include the true, real name of such person or persons transacting
said business or partnership" are excluded from the operation of the statute. It
is also deficient in that it fails to provide for any method of substituted or con-
structive service of process.
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the common law, present by inheritance rather than by affirmative
acquisition.
Resort to fiction would not really be required if the several
states would enact statutes similar to one found in Iowa 35 and
relied on in the cases of Davidson v. Doherty8 6 and Doherty v.
Goodman.37 In the last mentioned case, the plaintiff commenced
an action in Iowa against Doherty, a resident of New York, on
a cause of action arising out of a transaction carried on in Iowa,
where the defendant maintained an office. Service was had upon
an agent in charge of the local office. The defendant appeared
specially, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, and stood by
his plea. Judgment went against him and, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed, holding the Iowa statute to
be valid and constitutional. It must be acknowledged that the
business transacted concerned the sale of securities, a business
affected with a public interest to a greater degree than would be
true, for example, of one concerned with meats and vegetables.
This difference, however, should be thought of as one of degree
only and any distinction based thereon could well yield before the
important consideration of an announced public policy designed
to place local traders and non-resident traders on an equal basis.
The price for permitting non-residents to enjoy the fruits of doing
business locally should be that of requiring these non-residents
to be, by some lawful process, equally amenable to local suits.
If constitutional objections are advanced against a system
which would require the advance registration of business owners
and which would compel the designation of agents on whom sub-
stituted service might validly be had, it should be noticed that
,the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Doherty case,
35 Iowa Code 1931, § 11079, declared: "When a corporation, company, or indi-
vidual has, for the transaction of any business, an office or agency in any county
other than that in which the principal resides, service may be had on any agent
or clerk employed In such office or agency, in all actions growing out of or con-
nected with the business of that office or agency." 'With some revision, the text
thereof now appears in Iowa Code 1946, VoL 2, p. 2150, as Rule 56(f) and (g) of
Rules of Civil Procedure.
16 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A. L. R. 1308 (1932).
37294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed. 1.097 (1934).
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drew these propositions from the case before it, to-wit: (1) the
statute was applicable to the residents of any other county than
that in which the business occurred, whether living within or
without the state; (2) the statute treated residents of the state
exactly the same way it treated residents of all other states;
and (3) the non-resident who received the protection of the laws
of the state with regard to the transaction of his business there
ought to be amenable to the laws of the state with respect to
problems growing out of that business. Any statute drafted to
cover the situation should, then, be made applicable only if the
defendant has an office or agency in the county where the suit is
started, if the suit is conducted in a county other than the one
in which the defendant resides, if the action grows out of, or is
connected with, the business of that office or agency, and then
only provided the agent upon whom service is to be made is one
employed in that office or agency. Other aspects of due process
could be met if the statute made it clear that the agent should
actually receive notice of the suit and there was certainty, to a
moral degree, that the principal defendant or defendants would
also receive such notice and be given ample time in which to
appear and defend.
3 8
III. ENFORCEMENT OF OBIGATIONS
There would still remain the problem of enforcing the judg-
ment founded upon partnership liability. Since a judgment must
be satisfied out of the property belonging to the person against
whom it is directed, it should follow therefrom that, if the
original complaint is directed against the partnership as an entity,
only firm property could normally be taken. This would involve
some risk of identification, with the peril for mistake or wrongful
seizure on the creditor. If, on the other hand, the action looked
toward the rendition of a personal judgment based on a partner-
38 Resort could be had, for this purpose, to the method laid down in Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 951/, § 23, with respect to non-resident motorists, or Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 137, as to substituted service on residents not found.
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ship obligation, firm property as well as that of the individual
judgment debtor may be subjected to execution. 9
These are risks which the partners knew they must assume,
whether immediately or ultimately. Why, then, should satisfaction
of the creditor be blocked by technical barriers? If a partner dies
after becoming obligated on a partnership debt, there would seem
to be no good reason why his estate may not be reached even
though the surviving partners are capable of paying the debt.
40
To force the creditor to attempt collection from the survivors
before claiming against the dead partner's estate would again
seem to be a relic of a very ancient common law rule. If more
is needed, the treatment accorded to joint debtors, under which
suit against one or all is permitted with the possibility of the
rendition of several judgments against those served,4' should be
made applicable to partners, for they are joint debtors to the
same extent as those who are jointly liable even though not
partners.
To the extent that partnerships, or individual partners, have
property within the state in which the judgment is rendered, local
rules for the enforcement thereof should control. If enforcement
elsewhere becomes necessary, it has already been noted that a
greater degree of liberality in the matter of giving full faith and
credit to existing judgments would accomplish much in the way
of providing relief in the areas here discussed. In addition thereto,
a wider adoption of the uniform act for the enforcement of foreign
judgments4 2 should aid in the matter of making partnership obli-
gations fully enforcible.
The possibility of using attachment or some similar forms of
procedure for the collection of demands against partnerships has
not been overlooked, not because such measures are unavailable
39 No attempt has been made to go into problems of marshalling of assets or of
treatment to be accorded to firm and private creditors who may come into compe-
tition with one another.
40 Compare Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, 14 Am. Rep. 198 (1873), with Doggett v.
Dill, 108 Ill. 560, 48 Am. Rep. 565 (1884). See also Uniform Partnership Act,
§ 36(4).
41 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, §§ 151 and 174.
42 9 U.L.A. pp. 376-83; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 88 et seq.
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but rather because they may prove to be inappropriate, tardy, or
otherwise inadequate to reach more than a minimum amount of
assets at the place of venue. Lack of uniformity of procedure, the
peril of wrongfully attaching property mistakenly thought to
belong to the firm, the cost of such proceedings, and the reluctance
of custodians to guard carefully the property seized often out-
weigh theoretical advantages. Any in rem judgment so secured
would, of course, be of no value in the event further action should
become necessary to collect the balance of the demand.
43
IV. SUMMARY
If illustration be needed to demonstrate how fictions could be
utilized to improve existing law, reference might be made to the
one developed with respect to the acquisition and transfer of
partnership interests in real estate.44 While similar results have
been obtained in some jurisdictions through use of the equitable
conversion doctrine and, in a few earlier cases, it had been held
that dower or homestead would not attach to partner's interest
in firm real estate until after firm debts had been paid or the
partners had voluntarily partitioned by agreement, the adoption
of the innovations made under the applicable sections of the
Uniform Partnership Act provide evidence that the free use of a
creative imagination could greatly improve other areas of part-
nership law. Illinois has furnished the nation with leading cases
dealing with the application of these statutory innovations.
45 It
could well take the lead again by adopting reforms of the kind
here indicated.
In an effort to alleviate the hardships encountered by claim-
ants against partnerships, and endeavoring to place the adversary
parties in a more evenly balanced position with regard to their
litigation, the suggestion is offered that statutory reform be made
48 Salmon Fall Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F. 214 (19"22).
44 Uniform Partnership Act §§ 8 and 25; 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 106 ,
§§ 8 and 25.
45 See Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N. E. 446 (1923), and First Nat. Bank
of Charleston v. White, 268 Ill. App. 414 (1932).
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so as to include all partnership obligations under a comprehensive
statute designed to make all obligations joint and several ;48 that
venue and process statutes be enacted to provide for substitute
service on non-resident owners or partners by delivery of process
to their duly appointed local agents or, upon failure to appoint,
upon a designated public official ;47 that the saving provision with
respect to judgments against some joint debtors be retained ;48
that the law be made clear as to the right to seize the individual
property of any partner immediately to satisfy a partnership debt,
leaving that partner to seek any appropriate reimbursement from
his fellow partners; and that, in the event fictitious name statutes
should seem appropriate, they should be extended to provide for
the registration of all owners, partners not excluded.
If, in addition to a nation-wide uniform adoption of this
legislative program, the courts of the several states would come
to recognize the judgments of sister states, except in those in-
stances where there is a clear public policy against recognition,
these suggested reforms in law, already partly in effect in some
jurisdictions, would simplify the enforcement of claims against
partners without placing them under burdens any greater than
those carried by their adversaries.
46 The provision of the District of Columbia, set out in note 12, ante, could well
be borrowed in its present precise form. To avoid misconstruction, a provision
should be added for the repeal of all other acts inconsistent therewith.
47 The Iowa statute referred to in note 35, ante, is probably an outstanding
example. It could be revised in the fashion suggested In note 38, ante.
48 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Cb. 110, § 151.
